Abstract. The forcing theorem is the most fundamental result about set forcing, stating that the forcing relation for any set forcing is definable and that the truth lemma holds, that is everything that holds in a generic extension is forced by a condition in the relevant generic filter. We show that both the definability (and, in fact, even the amenability) of the forcing relation and the truth lemma can fail for class forcing.
Introduction
The classical approach to generalize the technique of forcing with set-sized partial orders to forcing with class partial orders is to work with countable transitive models M of some theory extending ZF − and partial orders P definable over M (in the sense that both the domain of P and the relation ≤ P are definable over the model M, ∈ ). By ZF − we mean the usual axioms of ZF without the power set axiom, however including Collection instead of Replacement.
1 In this situation, we say that a filter G on P is P-generic over M if G meets every dense subset of P that is definable over M . We let M P denote the collection of all P-names contained in M . Since M |= ZF − , M P is definable over M . Given a P-generic filter G over M , we define M [G] = {σ G | σ ∈ M P } to be the corresponding class generic extension. Finally, given a formula ϕ(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ) in the language L ∈ of set theory, a condition p in P and σ 0 , . . . , σ n−1 ∈ M P , we let p M P ϕ(σ 0 , . . . , σ n−1 ) denote the statement that ϕ(σ G 0 , . . . , σ G n−1 ) holds in M [G] whenever G is a P-generic filter over M with p ∈ G.
The forcing theorem is the most fundamental result in the theory of forcing with set-sized partial orders. The work presented in this paper is motivated by the question whether fragments of this result also hold for class forcing. Given a countable transitive model M of some theory extending ZF − , a partial order P definable over M and an L ∈ -formula ϕ(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ), we will consider the following fragments of the forcing theorem for notions of class forcing.
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if the set { p, σ 0 , . . . , σ n−1 ∈ P × M P × . . . × M P | p M P ϕ(σ 0 , . . . , σ n−1 )} is definable over M . (2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all σ 0 , . . . , σ n−1 ∈ M P and every P-generic filter G over M with the property that ϕ(σ G 0 , . . . , σ G n−1 ) holds in M [G], there is a condition p ∈ G with p M P ϕ(σ 0 , . . . , σ n−1 ). (3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the definability and the truth lemma for ϕ over M . Another basic result that is fundamental for the development of forcing with set-sized partial orders is the existence of a Boolean completion for separative partial orders, 2 its uniqueness up to isomorphism and the equality of the corresponding forcing extensions. This motivates our interest in the following notions.
(4) Let B be a Boolean algebra that is definable over M (in the sense that both the domain of B and all Boolean operations are definable over the model M, ∈ ). We say that B is M -complete if sup B A exists in B for every A ⊆ B with A ∈ M . (5) We say that P has a Boolean completion in M if there is an M -complete Boolean algebra B and an injective dense embedding π from P into B \ {0 B } such that both B and π are definable over M . (6) We say that P has a unique Boolean completion in M if P has a Boolean completion B 0 in M and for every other Boolean completion B 1 of P in M , there is an isomorphism in V between B 0 and B 1 which fixes P. In standard accounts on class forcing (see [Fri00] ) one studies generic extensions with additional predicates for the generic filter and the ground model and focuses on pretame (resp. tame) notions of forcing, i.e. notions of forcing which preserve ZF − (resp. ZF) with respect to these predicates. In particular, Sy Friedman shows in [Fri00] that if the ground model satisfies ZF, then every pretame forcing satisfies the forcing theorem. The converse is false: A simple notion of class forcing which does not preserve Replacement is Col(ω, Ord), the class of all finite partial functions from ω to Ord, ordered by reverse inclusion. However, this notion of forcing still satisfies the forcing theorem (see [Fri00, Proposition 2.25] or Section 6 of this paper). In this paper, we will mostly investigate properties of non-pretame notions of class forcing.
In the remainder of this introduction, we present the results of this paper. We will later prove these statements in a more general setting than the one outlined above. This will allow us to also prove results for models containing more second-order objects, like models of Kelley-Morse class theory KM (see [Ant15] ). We will outline this setting in Section 3.
Throughout this paper, we will work in a model V of ZFC and, given a set M and a recursively enumerable theory T extending ZF − , we say that "M is a model of T" to abbreviate the statement that M satisfies every axiom of T in V with respect to some formalized satisfaction relation (as in [Dra74, Chapter 3.5]). Note that, in general, the assumption that such a model V containing a transitive countable set M of T exists is stronger than the assumption that T is consistent. If T ⊇ ZF, then the results of this paper can also be proven in the setting of [Kun80, Ch. VII, §9, Approach (1b)], where one works with a language that extends the language of set theory by a constant symbolṀ , and a model of a theory in this language that extends T by the scheme of axioms stating that every axiom of T holds relativized toṀ . The consistency of this theory is equivalent to the consistency of T. For this paper, we have nonetheless chosen the first approach, because it makes many arguments more intuitive and easier to state.
Positive results.
The results of this paper will show that the forcing theorem (in fact both the definability of the forcing relation and the truth lemma), the amenability of the forcing relation and the existence of a (unique) Boolean completion can fail for class forcing. The following two positive results show that non-trivial implications hold between some of these properties. The first result shows that a failure of the forcing theorem already implies a failure of the definability lemma for atomic formulae. This result is proven by carefully mimicking the induction steps in the proof of the forcing theorem for set forcing. Theorem 1.1. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF − and let P be a partial order that is definable over M . If P satisfies the definability lemma for either " v 0 ∈ v 1 " or " v 0 = v 1 " over M , then P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae over M .
In Section 6, we will present a criterion that will allow us to show that many notions of class forcing satisfy the definability lemma for atomic formulae and thus, by the above result, the full forcing theorem (that is, the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae).
The next result shows that the existence of a Boolean completion is equivalent to the validity of the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae. We will prove this result by showing that the forcing relation for the quantifier-free infinitary language L Ord,0 of set theory, allowing set-sized conjunctions and disjunctions and also allowing reference to a predicate for the generic filter, is definable under either assumption listed in the theorem. Theorem 1.2. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF − and let P be a separative partial order that is definable over M . If either the power set axiom holds in M or there is a well-ordering of M that is definable over M , then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae over M .
(2) P has a Boolean completion in M .
Negative results.
In the following, we present results showing that each of the properties considered above can fail for class forcing. The first result shows that there is always a notion of class forcing that does not satisfy the definability lemma. The proof of this result uses a notion of class forcing that was introduced by Sy Friedman and that is mentioned in [Sta03, Remark 1.8].
We will present and study this notion of forcing in detail in Section 2.
Theorem 1.3. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF − . Then there is a partial order P that is definable over M and does not satisfy the forcing theorem for atomic formulae over M .
Our next result shows that even stronger failures of the definability lemma are possible for the above forcing. Its proof relies on so-called Paris models, i.e. ∈-structures M with the property that each ordinal of M is definable in M by a formula without parameters. Such models have been considered by Ali Enayat in [Ena05] . The stronger concept of pointwise definable models (that is, ∈-structures over which each of their elements is definable by a formula without parameters) was studied in depth in [HLR13] . Note that the existence of a countable transitive model of ZFC yields the existence of a countable transitive Paris model satisfying the axioms of ZFC -this follows from [HLR13, Theorem 11] , where it is shown that every countable transitive model of ZFC has a pointwise definable class forcing extension. However, in Section 8 we will, for the benefit of the reader, sketch a simplified argument to verify (the weaker statement) that certain countable transitive models of ZFC have class forcing extensions which are Paris models. Theorem 1.4. Let M be a countable transitive Paris model with M |= ZF − . Then there is a partial order P such that P is definable over M and the P-forcing relation for "
Next, we consider failures of the truth lemma. The witnessing forcing notion for the next theorem will be the two-step iteration of the above notion of class forcing that has a generic extension which is a Paris model and the aforementioned notion of class forcing of Sy Friedman.
Then there is a partial order P that is definable over M and that does not satisfy the truth lemma for " v 0 = v 1 " over M .
Finally, we show that the existence and uniqueness of a Boolean completion, in a countable transitive M |= ZF − of which there exists a well-order of order-type Ord M that is definable over M , of a notion of forcing P that is definable over M , are equivalent to P having the Ord-chain condition (or simply Ord-cc) over M , that is the property that every antichain of P that is definable over M is already an element of M . This will easily yield the following result. Theorem 1.6. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF − and suppose that there exists a global well-order of order type Ord M that is definable over M . Then there is a notion of class forcing which has two non-isomorphic Boolean completions in M .
Some notions of class forcing
In this section, we introduce several notions of class forcing that will later be used to verify the negative results listed in Section 1.
Notation. Since we will frequently use names for ordered pairs, we introduce the notation op(σ, τ ) = { { σ, ½ P }, ½ P , { σ, ½ P , τ, ½ P }, ½ P } for σ, τ ∈ M P and α ∈ Ord. Clearly, op(σ, τ ) is the canonical name for the ordered pair σ G , τ G .
It remains to check that for every α ∈ Ord M , Col ≥ (ω, α) is a complete subforcing of Col ≥ (ω, Ord) M . Let A be a maximal antichain of Col ≥ (ω, α) and let p ∈ Col ≥ (ω, Ord)
M . Consider the condition p ∈ Col ≥ (ω, α) which is obtained from p by replacing p(n) by ≥ α whenever p(n) ≥ α or p(n) is of the form ≥ β for some β > α. Since A is a maximal antichain, there is a ∈ A such that a andp are compatible. Letq ∈ Col ≥ (ω, α) be a common strengthening ofp and a. But then the condition q obtained fromq by replacingq(n) by p(n) for every n ∈ dom(p) such thatq(n) is of the form ≥ α witnesses that p and a are compatible.
The above computations show that, contrasting the situation with set-sized partial orders, forcing with a dense suborder of a notion of class forcing P can produce different generic extensions than forcing with P does.
3 In a subsequent paper ( [HKSa] ), we will in fact show that for any notion of class forcing P, the property that all forcing notions which contain P as a dense subforcing produce the same generic extensions as P, is essentially equivalent to the pretameness of P.
Corollary 2.3. If M is a countable transitive model of ZF − , then there are partial orders P and Q definable over M such that Q is a dense suborder of P and
In Section 6 we will show that all of the partial orders that we have mentioned so far satisfy the forcing theorem.
The 
, and whose ordering is given by It remains to check that F is an isomorphism between the models ω, E and M, ∈ . Take i, j < ω such that i E j, i.e. p i,j ∈ G. By the above computations, there is a condition p ∈ G with i, j ∈ dom(f p ). We then have i e p j and by (4) in Definition 2.4 we have
For the converse, suppose that x, y ∈ M such that x ∈ y. By the above computations, there is a condition p ∈ G and i, j ∈ d p with F (i) = f p (i) = x ∈ y = f p (j) = F (j). By (4) in Definition 2.4, this implies i e p j and therefore i E j holds.
The general setting
In the following, we outline the general setting of this paper. That is, we will actually make use of an approach that is slightly more general than the one presented in Section 1, namely one that works with models that might contain more second-order objects than just the definable ones, and moreover we will work with preorders instead of partial orders.
Notation.
(1) We denote by GB − the theory in the two-sorted language with variables for sets and classes, with the set axioms given by ZF − with class parameters allowed in the schemata of Separation and Collection, and the class axioms of extensionality, foundation and first-order class comprehension (i.e. involving only set quantifiers). Furthermore, we denote the theory GB − enhanced with the power set axiom by GB (this is the common collection of axioms of Gödel-Bernays set theory).
(2) We let KM denote the axiom system of Kelley-Morse class theory. That is, in addition to the usual ZFC axioms for sets with class parameters allowed in the schemata of Separation and Collection, one also has the class axioms of Foundation, Extensionality, Replacement, (second order) Comprehension and Global Choice. In particular, class recursion holds in models of KM. For a detailed axiomatization of KM, see [Ant15] . Fix a countable transitive model M = M, C of GB − . By a notion of class forcing (for M) we mean a preorder P = P, ≤ P such that P, ≤ P ∈ C. We will frequently identify P with its domain P . In the following, we also fix a notion of class forcing P = P, ≤ P for M.
We call σ a P-name if all elements of σ are of the form τ, p , where τ is a P-name and p ∈ P. Define M P to be the set of all P-names that are elements of M and define C P to be the set of all P-names that are elements of C. In the following, we will usually call the elements of M P P-names and we will call the elements of C P class P-names. If σ ∈ M P is a P-name, we define
to be its name rank. We say that a filter G on P is P-generic over M if G meets every dense subset of P that is an element of C. Given such a filter G and a P-name σ, we define the G-evaluation of σ as
and similarly we define
For all n < ω, we let L n denote the first-order language that extends the language of set theory L ∈ by unary predicate symbols A 0 , . . . , A n−1 . Given an L n -formula ϕ(v 0 , . . . , v m−1 ), a tuple Γ = Γ 0 , . . . , Γ n−1 ∈ (C P ) n , a condition p ∈ P and names σ 0 , . . . , σ m−1 ∈ M P , we write
4 While it does not really play any role for the present paper which second order objects we allow for in our generic extensions, we will argue in a subsequent paper ( [HKSb] ) that the above choice (namely
whenever G is a P-generic filter over M with p ∈ G. Whenever the context is clear, we will omit the superscripts and subscripts.
Our choice of considering preorders instead of partial orders is due to the reason that in the case of a two-step iteration P * Q of notions of class forcing, as defined in [Fri00] (see also Section 8 of the present paper), we will have conditions of the form p,q for p ∈ P and p forcing thaṫ q ∈Q. In general there will be distinct pairs p,q 0 and p,q 1 such that p Pq0 =q 1 , i.e. one naturally obtains a preorder that is not antisymmetric. However, in some contexts it will become crucial for our orderings to be antisymmetric. In that case we will use the following additional property:
Definition 3.2. We say that a model M, C of GB − satisfies representatives choice, if for every equivalence relation E ∈ C there is A ∈ C and a surjective map π : dom(E) → A in C such that x, y ∈ E if and only if π(x) = π(y).
Using representatives choice, given a preorder P = P, ≤ P ∈ C, by considering the equivalence relation p ≈ q iff p ≤ P q ∧ q ≤ P p, we obtain a partial order Q ∈ C and a surjective map π : P → Q in C such that for all p, q ∈ P, p ≈ q if and only if π(p) = π(q).
Clearly, representatives choice follows from the existence of a global well-order. Furthermore, if M satisfies the power set axiom, then we also obtain representatives choice, since we can use Scott's trick to obtain the sets
The forcing theorem
In this section, we fix a countable transitive model M = M, C of GB − and a notion of class forcing P = P, ≤ P for M. We will show that in order to obtain the forcing theorem for all L n -formulae, it suffices that the forcing relation for either the formula " v 0 ∈ v 1 " or the formula " v 0 = v 1 " is definable, thus proving Theorem 1.1.
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if
for all Γ ∈ (C P ) n . (2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all σ 0 , . . . , σ m−1 ∈ M P , Γ ∈ (C P ) n and every filter G which is P-generic over M with
We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the definability lemma and the truth lemma for ϕ over M.
Our goal is to prove a generalization of Theorem 1.1 in our general setting which allows for second-order objects. The first step to achieve this is to show that the definability lemma for some atomic formula already implies the truth lemma to hold for all atomic formulae.
Lemma 4.2. Assume that P satisfies the definability lemma for " v 0 ∈ v 1 " or " v 0 = v 1 " over M. Then P satisfies the forcing theorem for all atomic formulae.
Proof. Suppose first that the definability lemma holds for " v 0 ∈ v 1 ". We denote by p M, * P σ ⊆ τ the statement that for all ρ, r ∈ σ and for all q ≤ P p, r, the set
We show by induction on the lexicographic order on pairs rank(σ) + rank(τ ), rank(σ) that the following hold for each p ∈ P:
(1) p M P σ ∈ τ if and only if the set
There is a dense subset of P in C that consists of conditions p in P such that either p
To start the induction, note that if rank(σ) + rank(τ ) = 0, then (1)-(4) trivally hold. Note that (3) implies that the truth lemma holds for " v 0 ∈ v 1 ". Furthermore, (4) implies the truth lemma for " v 0 ⊆ v 1 " and hence also for equality. Suppose now that (1)-(4) are satisfied for all pairs of names σ,τ in M P for which rank(σ) + rank(τ ), rank(σ) is lexicographically less than rank(σ)+rank(τ ), rank(σ) , that is rank(σ)+rank(τ ) ≤ rank(σ)+rank(τ ) and in case of equality, we have that rank(σ) < rank(σ).
In order to prove (1), pick a condition p ∈ P with p M P σ ∈ τ and q ≤ P p. Let G be P-generic over M with q ∈ G. Then σ G ∈ τ G by assumption and hence there is ρ, r ∈ τ with r ∈ G and σ G = ρ G . By our inductive assumption, property (4) yields a condition s ∈ G with s M P σ = ρ which by (2) is equivalent to s M, * P σ = ρ. Since G is a filter, there is t ∈ G with t ≤ P q, r, s. In particular, t ∈ E σ,τ . For the other direction, suppose that E σ,τ is dense below p. Let G be P-generic over M with p ∈ G. By density of E σ,τ we can take q ∈ G and ρ, r ∈ τ such that q ≤ P r and q M, * P σ = ρ. Then r ∈ G and so ρ G ∈ τ G . Thus by our inductive assumption, condition (2) implies that
By our inductive assumption, we can find s ∈ G so that s M P ρ ∈ τ . Given any q * ≤ P q, by strengthening s if necessary, we can find such s ≤ P q * , as desired. Conversely, assume that p M, * P σ ⊆ τ and let G be P-generic over M with p ∈ G. Let ρ, r ∈ σ with r ∈ G. We have to show that ρ G ∈ τ G . Let q ∈ G be a common strengthening of p and r. Then by assumption, the set D ρ,τ is dense below q. By genericity, we can take s ∈ D ρ,τ ∩G. Using our inductive assumption, this shows that ρ G ∈ τ G , as desired. For (3), consider the set
Then our inductive assumptions imply that D ∈ C. Moreover, condition (1) states that D is nonempty below every p ∈ P with p M P σ ∈ τ . Hence it suffices to show that p
is a dense set of conditions deciding σ ∈ τ . So take p ∈ D and suppose that p M P σ / ∈ τ . Then there is a P-generic filter G containing p such that σ G ∈ τ G . Then there must be ρ, r ∈ τ with r ∈ G and σ G = ρ G . By our inductive assumption, we can find q ∈ G with q M P σ = ρ. By possibly strengthening q using that G is a filter, we may assume that q ≤ P p, r. But this contradicts that p ∈ D.
In order to verify (4), we define
As above, E is in C inductively, and it is nonempty below every condition which does not force σ ⊆ τ . As in the proof of (3) it remains to check that p M P σ τ for each p ∈ E. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is p ∈ E with p M P σ τ . Then there is a P-generic filter with p ∈ G and σ G ⊆ τ G . Let ρ, r witness that p ∈ E. Then r ∈ G and so ρ G ∈ σ G ⊆ τ G . Using (3) inductively, we obtain q ∈ G with q M P ρ ∈ τ . But then there is s ≤ P p, q, contradicting that p ∈ E.
If the definability lemma holds for " v 0 = v 1 ", we can define the P-forcing relation for " v 0 ∈ v 1 " by stipulating (as above) that p M P σ ∈ τ if and only if the set
Theorem 4.3. If P satisfies the definability lemma either for " v 0 ∈ v 1 " or for " v 0 = v 1 " over M, then P satisfies the forcing theorem for every L n -formula over M.
Proof. By the previous lemma, we already know that P satisfies the forcing theorem for all atomic formulae. Let us next consider formulas of the form " v 0 ∈ V 1 ", involving a class variable V 1 . Let σ ∈ M P and Γ ∈ C P . We claim that p M,Γ P σ ∈ Γ if and only if the set
Note that D ∈ C since the forcing relation for equality is definable. First assume that p M,Γ P σ ∈ Γ and let q ≤ P p. Let G be a P-generic filter with q ∈ G. Then σ G ∈ Γ G , i.e. there is τ, r ∈ Γ such that r ∈ G and σ G = τ G . By the truth lemma for " v 0 = v 1 ", there is s ∈ G such that s M P σ = τ . But then every t ≤ P q, r, s is in D. Conversely, if D is dense in P and G is P-generic over M with p ∈ G, then we find q ≤ P p in D ∩ G. By definition of D there is τ, r ∈ Γ such that q ≤ P r and q P σ = τ . Thus using that q, r ∈ G we get σ G = τ G ∈ Γ G . The truth lemma for " v 0 ∈ V 1 " follows from the truth lemma for equality.
For composite L n -formulae, we can define the forcing relation by the usual recursion:
where σ 0 , . . . , σ m−1 ∈ M P and Γ ∈ (C P ) n . The truth lemma can be verified as for set forcing in each case.
Boolean completions
In set forcing, every partial order has a unique Boolean completion whose elements are the regular open subsets of the partial order. In this section we will investigate the relationship between the existence of a Boolean completion and the forcing theorem for notions of class forcing. Let M = M, C be a fixed countable transitive model of GB − and let P = P, ≤ P be a notion of class forcing.
Let L Ord,0 denote the infinitary quantifier-free language that allows for set-sized conjunctions and disjunctions. By L Ord,0 (P, M ) we denote the language of infinitary quantifier-free formulae in the forcing language of P over M , that allows reference to the generic predicate G. More precisely, its constants are all elements of M P , and it has an additional predicateĠ. We define L Ord,0 (P, M ) and the class Fml Ord,0 (P, M ) of Gödel codes of L Ord,0 (P, M )-formulae by simultaneous recursion:
(1) Atomic L Ord,0 (P, M )-formulae are of the form σ = τ, σ ∈ τ orp ∈Ġ for σ, τ ∈ M P and p ∈ P, whereĠ = { p, p | p ∈ P} ∈ C P is the canonical class name for the generic filter. Gödel codes of atomic L Ord,0 (P, M )-formulae are given by
(2) If ϕ is an L Ord,0 (P, M )-formula, then so is ¬ϕ, and its Gödel code is given by ¬ϕ = 3, ϕ .
(3) If I ∈ M and for every i ∈ I, ϕ i is an L Ord,0 (P, M )-formula such that ϕ i | i ∈ I ∈ M , then so are i∈I ϕ i and i∈I ϕ i and their Gödel codes are given by
Now define Fml Ord,0 (P, M ) ∈ C to be the class of all Gödel codes of infinitary formulae in the forcing language of P over M . If G is a P-generic filter over M and ϕ is an L Ord,0 (P, M )-formula, then we write ϕ G for the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing each P-name σ occurring in ϕ by its evaluation σ G , and by evaluatingĠ as G. Note that ϕ G is a formula in the infinitary language L Ord,0 with an additional predicate for the generic G. Given an L Ord,0 (P, M )-formula ϕ and p ∈ P, we write p
Definition 5.1. We say P satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for L Ord,0 (P, M )-formulae if
and P satisfies the truth lemma for every L Ord,0 (P, M )-formula ϕ over M, i.e. for every P-generic
The following lemma will allow us to infer that the uniform forcing theorem for infinitary formulae is equivalent to the forcing theorem for equality.
Lemma 5.2. There is an assignment
(1)
for every ϕ ∈ L Ord,0 (P, M ).
Proof. We will argue by induction that, given names ν ψ and µ ψ satisfying (1) for every proper subformula ψ of ϕ, we can, uniformly in ϕ , define ν ϕ and µ ϕ such that (1) holds.
Observe that since ¬ i∈I ϕ i ≡ i∈I ¬ϕ i and ¬ i∈I ϕ i ≡ i∈I ¬ϕ i we can assume that all formulae are in negation normal form, i.e. the negation operator is applied to atomic formulae only. Next, due to the equivalences
we can further suppose that the only negated formulae are of the formp / ∈Ġ. For the atomic cases, let
It is easy to check that (1) holds for all atomic formulae. If ϕ is a conjunction of the form i∈I ϕ i and ν ϕi , µ ϕi have already been defined for i ∈ I, let
Now we define
Theorem 5.5. Assume that M satisfies representatives choice and let P = P, ≤ P be a separative and antisymmetric notion of class forcing for M. Then the following statements (over M) are equivalent:
(1) P satisfies the definability lemma for one of the
(2) P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae. (3) P satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for all L Ord,0 (P, M )-formulae.
(4) P has a Boolean completion. Moreover separativity and antisymmetricity of P are only necessary for the implication from (3) to (4), in particular the equivalence of (1)-(3) and those being a consequence of (4) holds as well without these assumptions. In fact, without these assumptions, (4) implies that P is separative and antisymmetric.
Proof. That (1) implies (2) is exactly the statement of Theorem 4.3. We start by showing that (2) implies (3). In fact, we only need to assume the forcing theorem for equality. By Lemma 5.2, for every L Ord,0 (P, M )-formula ϕ there are P-names µ ϕ and ν ϕ such that { ϕ , µ ϕ , ν ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fml Ord,0 (P, M )} ∈ C and ½ P P (ϕ ↔ µ ϕ = ν ϕ ). Therefore, we can define the forcing relation for L Ord,0 (P, M )-formulae by stipulating
This makes the truth lemma for ϕ an immediate consequence of the truth lemma for equality. As the definability lemma holds for equality and { ϕ , µ ϕ , ν ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fml Ord,0 (P, M )} ∈ C, we have { p, ϕ | p P ϕ} = { p, ϕ | p P ν ϕ = µ ϕ } ∈ C, thus proving the uniform forcing theorem for L Ord,0 (P, M )-formulae.
Assume now that (3) holds. We will construct what could be seen as an analogue of the Lindenbaum algebra. Define a Boolean algebra B in the following way: Consider the class Fml Ord,0 (P, M ) of all Gödel codes of infinitary formulae in the forcing language of P endowed with the canonical Boolean operations, i.e. suprema and infima are just set-sized disjunctions and conjunctions of formulae and complements are just negations. In order to obtain a complete Boolean algebra from Fml Ord,0 (P, M ), consider the equivalence relation ϕ ≈ ψ if and only if ½ P P ϕ ↔ ψ.
Since M satisfies representatives choice, there are B ∈ C and π ∈ C such that π : Fml Ord,0 (P, M ) → B is surjective and such that π( ϕ ) = π( ψ ) if and only if ϕ ≈ ψ . Now we can obtain induced Boolean operations on B in the obvious way and define 0 B = π( 0 = 0 ) and ½ B = π( 0 = 0 ).
Clearly, B is an M -complete Boolean algebra. We identify p ∈ P with the formula π( p ∈Ġ ), thus obtaining a dense embedding i : P → B in C. Note that the injectivity of i follows from the antisymmetry and separativity of P.
Finally, we prove that (4) implies (1). Assume that P has a Boolean completion B(P). Without loss of generality, we consider P to be a subset of B(P). For σ, τ ∈ M P , we recursively define the Boolean values
Clearly, the set { σ, τ, ϕ(σ, τ ) | σ, τ ∈ M P } is in C for every atomic L ∈ -formula ϕ(v 0 , v 1 ). We claim that for every atomic formula ϕ(v 0 , v 1 ), σ, τ ∈ M P and for every P-generic G,
This can be shown inductively by considering the recursive construction of ϕ(σ, τ ) . For example,
Finally, using (2) we prove that p P ϕ(σ, τ ) iff p ≤ B(P) ϕ(σ, τ ) . Since ≤ B(P) ∈ C, this will finish the proof of the theorem. Suppose that p P ϕ(σ, τ ). If p B(P) ϕ(σ, τ ) , then by separativity of B(P) and density of P in B(P) there is q ≤ P p such that q⊥ B(P) ϕ(σ, τ ) . Now let G be P-generic with q ∈ G. Then p is also in G, so by assumption
By (2) there is r ∈ G with r ≤ B(P) ϕ(σ, τ ) . But then r and q are compatible, and hence so are q and ϕ(σ, τ ) , which is impossible. The converse is an immediate consequence of (2).
In particular, this proves Theorem 1.2.
Corollary 5.6. If M is a model of GB then every separative antisymmetric pretame notion of class forcing for M has a Boolean completion in M.
Proof. In [Fri00, Theorem 2.18], it is shown that every pretame notion of class forcing satisfies the definability lemma for atomic formulae. The corollary thus follows from Theorem 5.5.
Lemma 5.7. If M is a model of KM, then every separative antisymmetric notion of class forcing for M has a Boolean completion in M.
Proof. Let M = M, C be a model of KM and let P = P, ≤ P be a separative antisymmetric notion of class forcing for M. Making use of a suitable bijection in C, we may assume that
Using class recursion, we define ⊆-increasing sequences P α | α ∈ Ord M and Q α | α ∈ Ord M of separative notions of class forcing containing P such that { p 0 , p 1 , α | p 0 ≤ Pα p 1 } ∈ C, { q 0 , q 1 , α | q 0 ≤ Qα q 1 } ∈ C and P is dense in each P * α and Q * α , where P * α and Q * α are the notions of class forcing obtained from P α or Q α respectively, by removing all conditions p which stengthen every other condition (i.e. which are equivalent to 0 Pα or 0 Qα respectively).
Let P 0 = P . If α is a limit ordinal, let P α = β<α P β and ≤ Pα = β<α ≤ P β for every β < α. Suppose that P α has been defined. We construct Q α by adding suprema for all subsets of P α in M , and then construct P α+1 by adding negations for all elements of Q α .
More precisely, let Q α = P α ∪ {sup A | A ∈ M, A ⊆ P α }, where sup A ∈ A 2·α is different for each A ∈ M with A ⊆ P α and { A, sup A | A ∈ M, A ⊆ P α } ∈ C. Thus Q α ∈ C and we define an ordering ≤ Qα on Q α with ≤ Qα ∩ (P α × P α ) = ≤ Pα and ≤ Qα ∈ C in the following way:
for all p ∈ P α , and A, B ∈ M with A ⊆ P α . Firstly, we check that P is dense in Q * α . If A ⊆ P α with A ∈ M such that sup A ∈ Q * α then A ∩ P * α = ∅. Now if a ∈ A is in P * α then a strenghtens sup A, and since by assumption P is dense in P * α , there is p ∈ P with p ≤ Pα a. In particular, p ≤ Qα sup A. In order to prove that Q α is separative, since sup{p} = p for p ∈ P α , it suffices to check that whenever A, B ⊆ P α are sets with sup A Qα sup B, then there is p ≤ Qα sup A incompatible with sup B. So suppose that sup A Qα sup B. Then there is a ∈ A with a Qα sup B, i.e. there exists a strengthening p ∈ P of a such that each q ≤ P p is incompatible with every element of B. In particular, p is incompatible with sup B.
Now let P α+1 = Q α ∪ {¬q | q ∈ Q α }, where ¬q ∈ A 2·α+1 is different for each q ∈ Q α , such that { q, ¬q | q ∈ Q α } ∈ C. Thus P α+1 ∈ C and we define an ordering ≤ Pα+1 on P α+1 extending ≤ Qα such that ≤ Pα+1 ∈ C as follows:
for all p, q ∈ Q α . Again, we need to verify that P is dense in P * α+1 . Let q ∈ Q α be a condition such that ¬q is non-zero, i.e. there is p ∈ P α+1 such that ¬q Pα+1 p. If p ∈ Q α , then this means that there is r ∈ Q α which is incompatible with p and q in Q α . In particular, r ≤ Pα+1 ¬q and since P is dense in Q α , we can strengthen r to some condition in P. Otherwise, p is of the form ¬r for some r ∈ Q α . Therefore, r Qα q and so by separativity of Q α there is s ∈ Q α with s ≤ Qα r and s⊥ Qα q. But then s ≤ Pα+1 ¬q and once again we apply the density of P in Q α to obtain the result.
Secondly, we need to check that separativity is preserved. First suppose that p, q ∈ Q α such that p Pα+1 ¬q. Then p and q are compatible, hence there is r ∈ Q α with r ≤ Qα p, q. In particular, r and ¬q are incompatible in P α+1 . If ¬p Pα+1 q, then there is r ∈ P such that r⊥ Qα p and r⊥ Qα q. But this means that r ≤ Pα+1 ¬p, ¬q and so r and q are incompatible in P α+1 . Finally, suppose that ¬p Pα+1 ¬q. Then q Qα p, so by separativity of Q α there is a strengthening r ∈ Q α of q with r⊥ Qα p. This means that r ≤ Pα+1 ¬p and clearly r is incompatible with ¬q.
Then α∈Ord M P α = α∈Ord M Q α is in C. However, the order given by p ≤ q if and only if there is α ∈ Ord M such that p, q ∈ P α and p ≤ Pα q is only a preorder. To obtain a partial order, consider the equivalence relation
For p ∈ α∈Ord P α , we define
and B(P) = {[p] | ∃α ∈ Ord M (p ∈ P α )}. Now we can introduce the ordering, suprema, infima and complements in B(P) in the canonical way and let ½ B(P) = [½ P ] as well as 0 B(P) = ¬½ B(P) .
More precisely, if A ⊆ B(P) is a set, then let α ∈ Ord M be least such that every member of A has a representative in (
, where β is the least ordinal withĀ ⊆ P β . It follows directly from (3) that sup A is well-defined and that it is the supremum of A in B(P). Complements are defined in the same way, i.e. for [p] ∈ B(P) with p ∈ Q α put ¬[p] = [¬p], where ¬p is defined in P α+1 . Again, it is a straightforward consequence of (4) and the density of P in Q * α that this is well-defined and that this actually defines the complement of [p] in B(P). Furthermore, if A ∈ M is a subset of B(P), then we let inf A = ¬(sup{¬a | a ∈ A}). Moreover, the embedding π : P → B(P) \ {0 B(P) }, p → [p] is dense by construction and it follows from P being separative and antisymmetric that π is injective.
Note that Robert Owen has erroneously used a similar proof in [Owe08] to show that in ZFC every separative antisymmetric notion of class forcing has a Boolean completion. However in Section 7 we will show that the definability lemma for atomic formulae can fail in ZF − (and also in ZFC), and hence Boolean completions do not always exist.
Regarding separativity, if the GB − -model M satisfies representatives choice, one can build a separative quotient for any notion of class forcing. Recall that the separative quotient is obtained by considering the equivalence relation p ≈ q if and only if ∀r ∈ P (r P p ↔ r P q).
Unlike in set forcing the equivalence classes can in fact be proper classes. Using representatives choice, there is a surjective map π : P → S(P) with π, S(P) ∈ C such that π(p) = π(q) if and only if p ≈ q. Furthermore, we equip S(P) with the usual ordering given by π(p) ≤ S(P) π(q) if and only if ∀r ∈ P(r P p → r P q).
It is straightforward to check that the ordering ≤ S(P) is well-defined. For σ ∈ M P , define recursively
It is easy to see that as in set forcing, P and S(P) generate the same generic extensions and Proof. Since by KM there is a global well-ordering of M, every notion of class forcing P of M has a separative quotient S(P) over M. Therefore, Lemma 5.7 implies that S(P) has a Boolean completion. By Theorem 5.5, S(P) satisfies the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae. Now by the above observations, this implies that P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae.
Approachability by projections
As usual, we fix a countable transitive model M = M, C of GB − . We define a fairly weak combinatorial condition on notions of class forcing that implies the forcing theorem to hold. In particular, this property is satisfied by the forcing notions Col(ω, Ord)
M , Col * (ω, Ord) M and Col ≥ (ω, Ord)
M from Section 2.
Definition 6.1. We say that a class forcing P = P, ≤ P for M is approachable by projections if it can be written as a continuous, increasing union P = α∈Ord M P α for a sequence P α | α ∈ Ord ∈ C of notions of set forcing P α = P α , ≤ Pα , where ≤ Pα is the ordering on P α induced by P, for which there exists a sequence of maps π α+1 | α ∈ Ord M so that π α+1 :
M , p ∈ P } ∈ C and for every α ∈ Ord M , the following hold:
∀p ∈ P α ∀q ∈ P (π α+1 (q) ≤ P p → q ≤ P p) and (5) π α+1 is the identity on P α .
Note that (in order to justify our terminology), each π α+1 is in particular (by (1)-(3)) a projection from P to P α+1 . It follows that each π α+1 is a dense embedding and thus π ′′ α+1 G is a P α+1 -generic filter whenever G is a P-generic filter.
Lemma 6.2. If P = α∈Ord M P α is approachable by projections with projections π α+1 : P → P α+1 and G is P-generic,
, and the latter is a union of set-generic extensions of M .
Proof. If σ is a P-name, then there is α ∈ Ord M such that σ is already a P α -name. Since π α+1 is dense, G α+1 = π Proof. Fix any ordinal α ∈ M . We will show by induction on name rank that the forcing relation for "v 0 ⊆ v 1 ", restricted to names that only mention conditions in P α , is definable. Then the forcing relation for " v 0 = v 1 " is definable by p P σ = τ if and only if p P σ ⊆ τ and p P τ ⊆ σ. It will be easy to see that this is uniform in α, thus implying the desired statement.
For σ, τ ∈ M Pα and p ∈ P define p * P σ ⊆ τ if and only if ∀ ρ, s ∈ σ∀q ≤ P p∃r ≤ P q(r ≤ P s → ∃ π, t ∈ τ (r ≤ P t ∧ r * P ρ = τ )). Similiarly, let π α+1 (p) * ,α+1 P σ ⊆ τ denote the same formula as above but where p is replaced by π α+1 (p), * P is replaced by * ,α+1 P and all quantifiers over P are restricted to P α+1 . Furthermore, p * P σ = τ is an abbreviation for p * P σ ⊆ τ and p * P τ ⊆ σ and similarly for * ,α+1 P . We will show by induction on the rank of P α -names that
The right-hand side is clearly definable with parameter α, since P α+1 is a set forcing. Moreover, by the usual proof, p * P σ ⊆ τ if and only if p P σ ⊆ τ . This shows that assuming ( * ), the forcing relation for "v 0 ⊆ v 1 " restricted to P α -names is definable.
Assume first that p P σ ⊆ τ and let ρ, s ∈ σ andq ≤ Pα+1 π α+1 (p). By (3) there is q ≤ P p such that π α+1 (q) ≤ Pq . By assumption there is r ≤ P q witnessing p * P σ ⊆ τ . Using (2), π α+1 (r) ≤ Pq . Now if r P s, then π α+1 (r) P s by (4). Otherwise, assume that π, t ∈ τ such that r ≤ P t and r * P ρ = π. Again by (2) and (5) we have π α+1 (r) ≤ P t and inductively, π α+1 (r) * ,α+1 P ρ = π. For the converse, suppose π α+1 (p) * ,α+1 P σ ⊆ τ and let ρ, s ∈ σ. Let q ≤ P p. By (2) we have π α+1 (q) ≤ P π α+1 (p) and thus there isr ≤ Pα+1 π α+1 (q) witnessing π α+1 (p) * ,α+1 P σ ⊆ τ . Using (3), choose r ≤ P q such that π α+1 (r) ≤ Pr . Now ifr⊥ Pα+1 s, then also r⊥ P s because if t ≤ P r, s, then π α+1 (t) ≤ Pr , s by (2) and (5). So assume thatr and s are compatible and takeū ∈ P α+1 such thatū ≤ Pr , s. Hence again using that π α+1 (p) * P σ ⊆ τ there isv ≤ Pα+1ū such thatv ≤ P s and there is π, t ∈ τ such thatv ≤ P t andv * ,α+1 P
Then by (4) we get that v ≤ P s, t and inductively, v * P ρ = τ . The following lemma shows that the converse does not hold in general.
Lemma 6.5. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of ZFC. There is a tame notion of class forcing which is not approachable by projections.
Proof. Let P be Jensen coding, as described in [BJW82] . Then P is a tame notion of forcing, i.e. it preserves ZFC. Assume that M |= GCH (otherwise ensure this by previously forcing GCH).
Then the extension of
for some real x which is not contained in any set forcing extension of M , so by Lemma 6.2, P cannot be approachable by projections.
The next lemma shows that approachability by projections is essentially a weakening of being an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings.
Lemma 6.6. If P = α∈Ord M P α is an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings (as witnessed by a class in C), then there is a dense embedding i ∈ C, i : P → B from P into an M -complete Boolean algebra B ∈ C which is approachable by projections. Moreover, P and B have the same generic extensions, i.e. whenever G is B-generic over M, then
Proof. By passing to separative quotients, we can assume that every P α is separative and antisymmetric. Since each P α is a set forcing, it has a Boolean completion B(P α ) given by the set of all regular open subsets of P α and there is a dense embedding e α : P α → B(P α ). By defining suitable embeddings i αβ from B(P α ) into B(P β ) and then forming the quotient of α∈Ord M B(P α ) modulo the equivalence relation b 0 ∼ b 1 iff b 1 = i αβ (b 0 ) if b 0 ∈ B(P α ) and b 1 ∈ B(P β ) and α < β or b 0 = i αβ (b 1 ) if b 0 ∈ B(P α ) and b 1 ∈ B(P β ) and α ≥ β, we obtain a Boolean algebra
} is a complete subforcing of B. Note that the equivalence classes are, in general, proper classes. We can avoid this problem by considering
Define, for every α ∈ Ord M , the projection π α+1 by setting
Straightforward calculations yield those projections to witness that B is approachable by projections. Moreover, i : P → B, i(p) = [e α (p)] for p ∈ P α is a dense embedding. By standard computations using that every P α is a complete subforcing of P and that the analogous property holds for B α and B, it holds that for every B-generic filter G,
Lemma 6.7. There is a notion of class forcing which is an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings but not pretame.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, the forcing notion Col ≥ (ω, Ord)
M is an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings, but it is not pretame since it adds a cofinal function from ω to the ordinals.
If we combine Lemma 6.6 and Theorem 6.4 with the results from the previous section, we obtain that every union of set-sized complete subforcings has a Boolean completion and satisfies the forcing theorem for all L n -formulae. As an application we obtain that any Ord M -length iteration and product of set forcing notions in M satisfies the forcing theorem for L n -formulae. Note however that the fact that unions of set-sized complete subforcings satisfy the forcing theorem for L ∈ -formulae has already been proven by Zarach in [Zar73] .
Failures of the definability lemma
The main goal of this section is to show that for every countable transitive model M of ZF − , the forcing relation of F M (as defined in Section 2) is not first-order definable over M, Def(M ) . Furthermore, we will prove that for certain models M of ZFC its forcing relation is not Mamenable. Whenever it is clear from context which model is referred to, we write F for F M . Unless stated otherwise, M = M, C will denote an arbitrary countable transitive model of GB − . Following [Dra74, Chapter 3.5], we let Fml ⊆ <ω ω denote the set of all codes for L ∈ -formulae. Since we work inside some model V of set theory and we use these codes inside countable transitive models that are elements of V together with the corresponding formalized satisfaction relation, we may assume that each element of Fml is the Gödel number ϕ of an L ∈ -formula ϕ. For k ∈ ω, let Fml k denote the set of all Gödel numbers for formulae with free variables among {v 0 , . . . , v k−1 }. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that every L ∈ -formula ϕ is in the following normal form: Whenever ∃v k ψ is a subformula of ϕ, then the free variables of ψ are among {v 0 , . . . , v k }.
holds for every ϕ ∈ Fml 1 and every x ∈ M .
Let G be an F-generic filter over M and let E and F be defined as in the proof of Lemma 2.6. Then
is a first-order truth predicate for M and, by Tarski's Undefinability Theorem, T cannot be defined over M by a first-order formula. In the following, we will show that definability of the forcing relation for F would lead to a first-order definition of T .
Notation. If x = x 0 , . . . , x k−1 is a sequence in M , we say that a sequence n = n 0 , . . . , n k−1 in ω is appropriate for x, if for all i, j < k, x i = x j if and only if n i = n j . We inductively define p x n ∈ F as follows, whenever n is a sequence of natural numbers which is appropriate for x.
(
Clearly, we obtain that whenever x extends y, n extends m and n is appropriate for x, then p x n ≤ F p y m . Furthermore, we define p x to be the condition p x n , where n is the lexicographically smallest sequence which is appropriate for x.
Before we proceed to prove that the definability lemma can fail for F, we need a translation from L ∈ -formulae to L ω1,0 (F, M )-formulae so that we can apply Theorem 5.5, where L ω1,0 (F, M )-formulae are L Ord,0 (F, M )-formulae in which all conjunctions and disjunctions are countable.
Notation. Inductively, we assign to every L ∈ -formula ϕ with free variables in {v 0 , . . . , v k−1 } and all sequences n = n 0 , . . . , n k−1 of natural numbers an L ω1,0 (F, M )-formula ϕ * n as follows:
If n = 0, . . . , k − 1, then we simply write ϕ * for ϕ * n and if x is a sequence in M and n is such that p x = p x n , then we write ϕ * x for ϕ * n . In particular, if v 0 is the only free variable of ϕ, then ϕ * x is ϕ * .
The next lemma is the key ingredient to obtain a first-order truth predicate T for M. We will use the translation of L ∈ -formulae to L ω1,0 (F, M )-formulae to define truth by M, ∈ |= ϕ(x) if and only if ω, E |= ϕ(n), where n = F (x), if and only if p x F ϕ * x . Lemma 7.2. For every L ∈ -formula ϕ with free variables among {v 0 , . . . , v k−1 } and for all x = x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ∈ M , the following conditions hold:
Proof. First, we verify that for every formula ϕ with free variables among {v 0 , . . . , v k−1 }, and for all n ∈ ω k appropriate for x,
Let p (1) and (2) immediately follow from the forward directions of (2) and (1) respectively.
For equations this is obvious. Suppose now that M |= x ∈ y. Let G be generic over M with
The converse is similar.
For negations, both (1) and (2) follow directly from the induction hypothesis. We turn to disjunctions. Assume that M |= (ϕ ∨ ψ)( x). Without loss of generality, assume that M |= ϕ( x). Then inductively, we get that p
. This means that M |= ¬ϕ( x) and M |= ¬ψ( x). By assumption, this means that p
Then there is y ∈ M such that M |= ϕ( x, y). This means that p x,y F ϕ * x,y . Let n be the sequence such that p x = p x n . Now observe that by ( * ), we have for every i ∈ ω such that n, i is appropriate for x, y that p x,y n,i F ϕ * n,i . Take an F-generic filter G over M with p x = p x n ∈ G. By a density argument, there is i ∈ ω such that n, i is appropriate for x, y and p x,y n,i ∈ G. By assumption, this implies that
Then for every y ∈ M , M |= ¬ϕ( x, y). Let n be the sequence in ω k with p x = p For the rest of this section, we will assume, without loss of generality, that whenever ϕ has exactly one free variable v i , then i = 0. Theorem 7.3. If F satisfies the definability lemma for " v 0 ∈ v 1 " or for " v 0 = v 1 " over M, then C contains a first-order truth predicate for M .
Proof. If the definability lemma holds either for " v 0 ∈ v 1 " or for " v 0 = v 1 ", then F satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for L Ord,0 (F, M )-formulae as a consequence of Theorem 5.5. But then by Lemma 7.2,
is a first-order truth predicate for M .
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF − . Assume, towards a contradiction, that the set { p, σ, τ | p
is a model of GB − and F satisfies the definability lemma for atomic formulae over M. By Theorem 7.3, there is a first-order truth predicate for M that is first-order definable over M . This contradicts Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth.
Theorem 7.3 can also be used to provide an alternative proof of the following well-known fact.
Corollary 7.4. If M is a model of KM, then C contains a first-order truth predicate for M .
Proof. By Theorem 5.8, F satisfies the definability lemma for all L n -formulae over M, so by Theorem 7.3, C contains a first-order truth predicate for M .
We can even do better and find fixed names ν and µ ∈ M F such that the forcing theorem for ν = µ implies the existence of a first-order truth predicate.
(1) If ϕ has one free variable and
Proof. Since the proof of (2) is a simplified version of the proof of (1), we only verify (1). Choose an antichain {q n | n ∈ ω} ⊆ F such that for every n ∈ ω, 0 / ∈ dom(q n ), e.g. take q n = {1, . . . , n + 1}, { 1, n + 1 }, ∅ .
Consider the names ν ϕ * , µ ϕ * as defined in Lemma 5.2. We will only consider non-atomic formulae, since all atomic formulae with at most one free variable are either tautologically true or false. The proof of Lemma 5.2 shows that for ϕ ∈ Fml 1 with ϕ non-atomic, all elements of ν ϕ * , µ ϕ * are of the form τ, ½ F for some τ ∈ M F . Let k : ω → Fml 1 be a bijection and let j : ω → Fml ω1,0 (F, M ) be given by j(n) = ϕ * , where k(n) = ϕ . Now set
This yields that q n F ν = ν j(n) and q n F µ = µ j(n) for each n ∈ ω. Moreover, since 0 / ∈ dom(q n ), p x 0 and q n are compatible for every x ∈ M and n ∈ ω. For ϕ ∈ Fml 1 , we put
To check (1), suppose first that M |= ϕ(x) for some L ∈ -formula ϕ and x ∈ M . Let r ∈ F be such that r ≤ F p x , q ϕ . Since r ≤ F q ϕ , r F ν = ν ϕ * ∧ µ = µ ϕ * . On the other hand, since r ≤ F p x , Lemma 7.2 implies that r F ϕ * , i.e. by Lemma 5.2, r F ν = µ. Conversely, assume that M |= ¬ϕ(x). By (1) applied to the negation of ϕ, we have that for all r ≤ F p x , q ¬ϕ , r F µ = ν. Since p x and q ¬ϕ are compatible, such r exists. Now let π be the automorphism on F which for p = d p , e p , f p swaps all occurrences of k −1 ( ¬ϕ ) and k −1 ( ϕ ) in d p , e p and dom(f p ). Then π(q ¬ϕ ) ≤ F q ϕ and π(p x ) = p x . In particular, π(r) ≤ F p x , q ϕ and so π(r) F ν = ν ϕ * ∧ µ = µ ϕ * . Moreover, since π(r) ≤ F p x , by Lemma 7.2 we obtain π(r) F ¬ϕ * . Finally, by Lemma 5.2, this proves that π(r) F µ ϕ * = ν ϕ * and so π(r) F µ = ν.
Corollary 7.6. There exist ν, µ ∈ M F such that if {p ∈ F | p F µ = ν} ∈ C, then C contains a first-order truth predicate for M . In particular, {p ∈ F | p F µ = ν} is not definable over M .
In the remainder of this section, we show that amenability of the forcing relation for the forcing F can consistently fail. We will work with a countable, transitive Paris model M |= ZF − (see Section 1). Note that the least α such that L α |= ZF − is such a model.
Lemma 7.7. Let M be a countable transitive Paris model with M |= ZF − . Then
is not an element of M , where q ϕ , µ, ν are as in Lemma 7.5.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that X ∈ M . Observe that for every L ∈ -sentence,
Consider C = { ϕ | q ∃!x∈Ord ϕ(x) ∈ X}. Since X ∈ M , so is C. Observe that we can order the elements of C by ϕ < ψ ⇐⇒ q ∃x,y∈Ord[x<y∧ϕ(x)∧ψ(y)] ∈ X.
As a consequence of (5), we know that C, < has order type Ord M , a contradiction.
In particular, this shows Theorem 1.4.
A failure of the truth lemma
In this section, we show that the truth lemma can consistently fail for class forcing. Note that by Lemma 5.2, if we find a notion of class forcing and an infinitary formula for which the truth lemma fails, then we automatically obtain that it fails for " v 0 = v 1 ".
We need the following basic result about two-step iterations of class forcing.
Lemma 8.1 ([Fri00], Lemma 2.30 (a)). Let M = M, C be a countable transitive model of GB − , let P be a tame notion of class forcing and letQ ∈ C P be a class name for a preorder. Then we define the two-step iteration of P andQ by P * Q = { p,q | p ∈ P ∧ p Pq ∈Q} equipped with the ordering given by p 0 ,q 0 ≤ P * Q p 1 ,q 1 iff p 0 ≤ P p 1 and p 0 Pq0 ≤Qq 1 . If G is P-generic and H isQ
If P is any notion of class forcing that satisfies the forcing theorem, we denote byḞ the canonical class P-name for
. As an example of the failure of the truth lemma, we will consider two-step iterations where the second iterand will be of the form
, where G is generic for the first iterand.
Theorem 8.2. Let M = M, C be a countable transitive model of GB. Let P be a notion of class forcing which is definable over M and has the following properties:
is not a Paris model. Then the truth lemma fails for P * Ḟ.
Proof. We will find an infinitary formula Φ in L Ord,0 (P * Ḟ, M ) such that if G * H is P * Ḟ-generic over M, then Φ G * H expresses that M [G] is a Paris model. Using this, we choose G as in (b). Then Φ G * H holds, while by (c), there cannot be a condition in G * H forcing this, implying that the truth lemma fails for P * Ḟ.
Given a formula ϕ with exactly one free variable, let Ψ ϕ denote the formula
i.e. Ψ ϕ (x) states that "x is unique such that ϕ(x) holds". Similarly, let Ω(x) be the formula expressing that x is an ordinal. If
is a Paris model if and only if for all ordinals
. Now recall that as described in Section 7, for each ϕ we can assign to Ψ ϕ , Ω and n ∈ ω infinitary formulae (Ψ ϕ ) * n and Ω * n in the forcing language of F M [G] with the properties (as in Lemma 7.2)
n . However, since we will need infinitary formulae in the forcing language of P * Ḟ, we have to modify this approach slightly. For a formula ψ and n ∈ ω, we define ψ * * n in the same way we defined ψ * n , but we replace every occurence of some condition p ∈ F M[G] by ½ P ,p ∈ P * Ḟ. Note that this is possible, since for every condition p which appears in ψ * n , the function f p is empty, and so p ∈ M . Let Φ = n∈ω ϕ ∈Fml1
[Ω * *
We claim that M [G] is a Paris model if and only if M [G]
[H] |= Φ G * H holds for every (or, equivalently, for some) filter H which is
and n ∈ ω. By a density argument, there is
P be a name for x. Since P is tame, it satisfies the truth lemma and hence there is q ∈ P with q
If not, we can proceed as before and obtain q ∈ G such that q,ṗ
n , which is contradictory. Remark 8.3. By a special case of more general results in [Ena05] and [HLR13] there is a tame notion of class forcing P * such that for every countable transitive GB − -model of the form M = M, Def(M ) , there is a P * -generic filter G over M such that M [G] is pointwise definable. For the benefit of the reader, we will describe a very simple tame notion of class forcing P and indicate a proof that there is a P-generic extension which is a Paris model over any countable transitive
The outline of the argument follows the proof of [Ena05, Theorem 2.8].
P is a two-step iteration, where the first step is to force with Q = 2 <Ord , ⊇ (note that this forcing notion does not add new sets) and construct a Q-generic filter U such that all ordinals of M are first-order definable over M, ∈, U without parameters (this construction of U is done as in [HLR13] ). The second step is to code the generic U into the continuum function, using a reverse Easton iteration. Since the ground model L is definable in the extension and every element of L is definable in L from an ordinal, it follows that M [G] is pointwise definable. The forcing notion P described in Remark 8.3 satisfies (a) and (b) over any countable transitive model of GB − of the form M, Def(M ) . We will now give two consistent examples of such models over which P also satisfies Condition (c) in the statement of Theorem 8.2. In particular, this proves Theorem 1.5.
Non-isomorphic Boolean completions
Any separative set-sized partial order P has a Boolean completion that is provided by the regular open subsets of P, and this completion is unique: if B 0 and B 1 are both Boolean completions of P and e 0 : P → B 0 and e 1 : P → B 1 are dense embeddings, then one can define an isomorphism by f (b) = sup{e 1 (p) | p ∈ P ∧ e 0 (p) ≤ b} for b ∈ B 0 . Moreover, f fixes P in the sense that f (e 0 (p)) = e 1 (p) for every condition p ∈ P. This proof however does not work for class forcing since in general, we can only form set-sized suprema within M-complete Boolean algebras. In the remainder of this section, we will show that the result actually fails for class forcing.
Definition 9.1. We say that a notion of class forcing P has a unique Boolean completion in M, if P has a Boolean completion B 0 in M and for every other Boolean completion B 1 of P in M there is an isomorphism in V between B 0 and B 1 which fixes P. Definition 9.2. We say that a notion of class forcing P satisfies the Ord-chain condition (or simply Ord-cc) over M, if every antichain of P which is in C is already in M .
Lemma 9.3. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem and let A ⊆ P be a class in C such that A does not have a supremum in P. Let Q = P ∪ {sup A}, where sup A ∈ M is a new element which is not in P and let ≤ Q be such that ≤ Q ↾ (P × P) = ≤ P , sup A ≤ Q p ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A(a ≤ Q p) and p ≤ Q sup A ⇐⇒ A is predense below p.
Then Q satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. For σ ∈ M Q , let σ + denote the P-name obtained from σ by replacing every occurrence of sup A in tc(σ) by ½ P , and let σ − ∈ M P be the name obtained from σ by removing every pair of the form µ, sup A from tc(σ). To be precise about the latter, we inductively define σ − = { τ − , p ∈ σ | p = sup A}. One easily checks that for all p ∈ Q and all Q-names σ and τ ,
where q ≤ P A abbreviates ∃a ∈ A (q ≤ P a) and q⊥ P A abbreviates ∀a ∈ A (q⊥ P a).
Under below assumptions on M, the authors originally showed that there is a particular class forcing for M which has a non-unique Boolean completion. The following more general result was then observed and pointed out to the authors by Joel David Hamkins.
Theorem 9.4. Let M = M, C be a model of GB − such that C contains a well-order of M of order type Ord M . Then a separative antisymmetric notion of class forcing P for M has a unique Boolean completion in M if and only if it satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M. As can easily be observed from the combinatorial characterization of pretameness in [Fri00, Chapter 2.2], since C contains a global well-order of M , P is pretame and therefore it has a Boolean completion B(P) ∈ C by Corollary 5.6. Let B be another Boolean completion of P. Without loss of generality, we can assume that P is a subset of B. Then every element b ∈ B satisfies b = sup B D b , where D b = {p ∈ P | p ≤ B b} ∈ C. But using the global well-order of M we obtain that D b contains an antichain which is maximal in D b . Moreover, since P satisfies the Ord-cc, every such antichain lies in M . Furthermore, observe that if A and A ′ are two antichains which are maximal in D b , then sup B A = sup B A ′ = b and sup B(P) A = sup B(P) A ′ . But this gives a canonical embedding of B into B(P) which fixes P. It is clearly surjective, since the same argument as above can be done within B(P). This shows that P has a unique Boolean completion in the sense of Definition 9.1.
Conversely, assume that C contains an antichain A of P which is not in M . Moreover, suppose that P satisfies the forcing theorem and therefore it has a Boolean completion B(P) as provided by Theorem 5.5 (otherwise P has no Boolean completion and in particular no unique Boolean completion). We may assume that P ⊆ B(P). Note that A remains a class-sized antichain in B(P).
We have shown that in certain models, there is a tame notion of class forcing P such that P * Ḟ does not satisfy the truth lemma. However the following question is still open.
Question 10.5. Is there a notion of class forcing P such that for every model of ZFC, the truth lemma for P fails?
Furthermore, we do not know whether the two-step iteration of notions of class forcing satisfying the truth lemma, with the first forcing in fact being tame, again satisfies the truth lemma, thus also the following question is open.
Question 10.6. Does the forcing F, as introduced in Section 2, provably satisfy the Truth Lemma?
